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Abstract
In 2016, some 55 economies introduced at least 112 measures affecting foreign
investment. Two thirds of these measures sought to liberalise, promote and facilitate
new investment (falling since 2016). Almost a third of these measures are new restrictions
(increasing since 2016). Restrictive policies are growing in trade policy choices. This
paper investigates the effects of restrictions on FDI stocks among OECD countries. Using
a gravity model with panel data from 2010 to 2017 for all OECD countries, we suggest
negative effects of restrictions on FDI stocks. Services sector deregulation and strict
environmental restrictions have positive effects on FDI. Therefore, the difference in
FDI restrictions between countries emerges as the key factor for foreign investment.
This study also shows the substitution between foreign and domestic investment in the
presence of FDI restrictions. The optimal policy to be implemented to attract FDI is to
liberalise or deregulate the services sector specifically the financial sector.
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I. Introduction
The global financial crisis highlighted the need for competitive and effective policies
or a strong regulatory framework to address the risks facing the market. The World
Bank, in its World Development Report 2005, underlined the importance of an attractive
investment climate. It notes that a good investment environment, which considers the
local institutions, regulations and policies in which companies operate, stimulates eco-
nomic growth by providing incentives for companies to invest. In this case, regulation
has an impact on job creation and sustainability.
International capital flows, in particular Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), play a key
factor of economic growth and globalization. Indeed, FDI can increase productivity
and change the comparative advantage of host countries. The establishment of multina-
tional firms, capital accumulation or delocalization can reduce unemployment, income
inequality, enhance technology transfer, increase product variety through innovation,
Dritsaki and Stiakakis (2014). However, several factors determine the massive inflow of
FDI into a country and its effectiveness in economic growth, Alfaro et al. 2004; Li and
Liu 2005; Batten and Vo 2009; Desbordes and Vicard (2009). A strong macroeconomic
framework helps to attract more FDI into a country (tax rates, restrictions on financial
transactions, legal framework, economic and political stability, etc...)
Research showing the link between FDI and regulation suggests that the FDI sector
is far less liberalized than trade in goods and services, Ghosh et al (2012). Although
regional, bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements that reduced formal
barriers, restrictions are still significant in some countries and affect FDI. The regulatory
framework plays a key role in FDI flows. Indeed, regulation has a profound and durable
impact on a firm’s financial choices and is seen as a key driver of investment. To
encourage investment, authorities need to reduce investment costs, minimize the risks
associated with investment and create an appropriate climate for the domestic economy.
Regulation must be both optimal and competitive, protecting investors from potential
risks, promoting competition between firms across borders and protecting consumers
from higher prices.
In 2018, FDI represented around 2% of the EU’s GDP and 1.5% of GDP in all OECD
countries (see figure A.1). But we note that these investments decreased from 3% to 1%
of GDP between 2016 and 2018, which is contrary to the acceleration of GDP growth
and trade. These trends are more significant in developed countries than emerging
countries (Cf. figures A.2 and A.3). In this year, some 55 economies introduced at least
112 measures affecting foreign investment. Two thirds of these measures sought to
liberalise, promote and facilitate new investment (falling since 2016). Almost a third
of these measures are new restrictions (increasing since 2016), UNCTAD (2019). How
can we explain the decline of inward investment in these countries?. Is it caused by
high market regulation, sub-optimal policies? What is the real impact on investments of
entry barriers? Did investment restrictions stimulate capital accumulation in markets?
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of FDI restrictions on FDI. It attempts
to explain the impacts of entry barriers on FDI. Is it necessary to regulate the FDI market
or is it better to liberalize the FDI sector in order to stimulate competition and firms
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investment? The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal policy for FDI in
order to achieve sustainable economic growth. Finally, it will allow policy-makers to
identify policies that promote FDI.
The existing empirical literature on the impact of FDI restrictions has shown the negative
impact of FDI restrictions on inward FDI, Nicoletti et al (2003), Ghosh et al (2012). The
theoretical approach suggests limiting effects of the regulation on new firm entry and a
positive effect on incumbent firms’ investment, Brito et al (2010), Mizuno and Yoshino
(2012) . To our knowledge, no previous study has empirically measured the impact of
services sector deregulation on inward FDI and shown the substitution between foreign
and domestic investment in the presence of FDI restrictions. Therefore, the studies
used panel data up to 2012. Accordingly, this paper adds to the existing literature
by addressing the following issues: what are the effects of FDI restrictions on inward
FDI through panel data from 2010-2017. What is the importance of services sector
deregulation for FDI.
To conduct this study, we use a gravity model based on aggregate FDI stocks data from
all OECD countries to 2010-2017 and FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
which measures the level of restriction in FDI sector. Our results show negative and
significant effects of restrictions on FDI and a positive impact of service deregulation on
FDI specifically the financial sector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section documents recent
literature on the effects of FDI regulation on investment. In the second part, we describe
our econometric model with data, sources, and the type of regression used. The third
section presents and discusses the results. The last section uses the results of this study
to perform policy simulation.
II. Literature review
In this section, we reviewed empirical studies about the impact of regulations on FDI.
We categorize the literature according two approaches. First, we examine studies
highlighting the effects of FDI restrictions on bilateral FDI flows using FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index. Second, we look at literature on the impacts of market acess
regulation on firm investment through model à la Stackelberg.
i. FDI restrictions and FDI: Gravity analysis through FDI Regula-
tory Restrictiveness Index
Few studies have highlighted the impact of restrictions on FDI flows through the OECD
FDI regulatory restrictiveness index. A first to expose its impacts remains Nicoletti
et al (2003). Based on original version of the index created by Golub (2003) and the
OECD’s PMR1, they investigate the effects of FDI restrictions and other policies on
foreign direct investment in a panel of 28 OECD countries between 1980 and 2000. The
paper uses a gravity model to control bilateral outward FDI flows and a dynamic panel
model to explain total multilateral inward FDI stocks. Their results suggest that FDI
1Product Market Regulation index.
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restrictions could reduce bilateral outward FDI stocks by between 10% and 80% on
average, depending on the type of restriction. Inward FDI stocks are also impacted by
FDI restrictions, but the results should be treated carefully due to the lack of variability
of restrictions across OECD member countries.
The analysis of Ghosh et al (2012) similar to the previous one shows the impact of
restrictions on inward FDI stocks using panel data (1981-2004) for 23 OECD countries.
Based on the updated of Koyama and Golub (2006) index and a gravity model, they find
significant negative effects of restrictions on inward FDI stocks.
To determine the short- and long-run effects of the restrictions, they use an autoregressive
distributed lag model. Their results show that the short-run elasticity estimated was
between 0.06 and -0.14, and the long-run elasticity between -0.64 and -1.49.
Fournier (2015) examines the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1998
to 2013, including FDI restrictions. Using gravity models and the recent version of the
OECD FDI restrictiveness index, he finds a significant negative impact of restrictions on
FDI stocks after controlling for various political and structural determinants of bilateral
FDI.
The Work of Ahrend and Goujard (2012) indicates that FDI restrictions may contribute to
greater risks of financial crisis. Indeed, higher restrictions in OECD countries, measured
by OECD indexes, and anti-competitive product market regulation have contributed to
reduced financial stability. That is due to a rise of countries’ debt over FDI or capital
investment. By contrast, more stringent capital regulations for banks and more openness
to foreign bank entry have reduced the vulnerability to financial contagion.
Arbatli (2011) uses capital account restriction indices based on IMF’s AREAER database2.
Through a binary index of FDI restrictions, he investigates the determinants of FDI flows
into emerging economies. The author creates two binary indicators of FDI restrictions:
one that assesses the existence of any restrictions on FDI inflows; and one that captures
restrictions on the liquidation of direct investment. He uses a dynamic panel model
approach to model FDI flows and data for 46 countries over 20 years. The results suggest
that FDI capital restrictions have a significant negative effect on inward FDI, but no
significant effect was found for restrictions on the liquidation of investment.
Binici, Hutchison and Schindler (2009) as above apply an index of capital restrictions
based on IMF’s AREAER information, by asset class and covering 74 countries over
the period 1995-2005. They study the effects of FDI and equity portfolio investment
restrictions on total inward and outward FDI and equity portfolio investment. The
results suggest that restrictions control capital outflows, not inflows.
2Database on the exchange rates and trade regimes of all members of the International Monetary Fund
(currently 189 countries) and three territories (Aruba, Hong Kong SAR, and Curaa¸o and Sint Maarten -
formerly the Netherlands Antilles).
4
ii. Market access regulation and firm investment: Stackelberg
model
The authors used a competition model à la Stackelberg to perceive the different effects
of market acess regulation on investment. We have two firms in telecommunication
market (incumbent and incoming). The incumbent operator is a vertically integrated
firm that owns a network and operates in the retail market. The incoming operator is
active on retail market and must have access to incumbent’s network. We assume that
only incumbent operator can invest in the deployment of a next-generation network
that improves the quality of retail services.
One author who pointed out the link between market access regulation and firm entry
into the telecommunications sector is Brito et al (2010). They develop a model of
competition between incumbent and incoming firms. The last one who enters without
installations needs to have access to the existing operator’s network and therefore pays
an access price. They model this sector as a duopoly of differentiated products3, where
only existing operator can invest in the deployment of a new generation network to
improve the quality of services. We have a regulator who sets the access price for existing
firm’s network access. Two scenarios are presented: first is a access price regulation
before investment of existing firm, and second is the absence of a regulation authority.
In the first case, if regulator sets a high access price, existing firm invests in the next
generation network and the new company exits the market. Secondly, if the access fee is
low, existing firm does not invest and new firm enters the market and we arrive at a
sub-optimal situation because it reduces welfare. However, in the absence of regulation,
the existing firm only invests if investment cost is low.
The works of Foros (2004) and Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) are also identical to the
previous ones. In a context where only the incumbent operator invests and where firms
are assumed to be heterogeneous in their productivity, Foros (2004) shows that access
price regulation can reduce consumer surplus and welfare if retailers do not diversify
their product. Also, if the incumbent’s investment in advanced services is much higher
than its rival’s, it uses overinvestment as an alternative tool for foreclosure.
Based on Foros’ model, Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) show that the effects of market access
regulation on both firms’ investment. However, their analysis differs from the firsts
because they consider the spillover effects of the incoming firm’s access to the existing
firm’s infrastructure. They find that when the spillovers are low (the new firm has little
benefit from the facilities) and the incumbent’s investment cost is higher, this leads to
high access prices through over-investment by the incumbent firm. In equilibrium, the
high access cost leads to market foreclosure. However, when the spillovers are low
and the incumbent’s investment cost is low, the incumbent induces a low access fee by
under-investing in infrastructure, the new firm enters the market.
The first analysis of Manenti and Scialà (2013) examined the impact of regulation on
the existing firm’s investments and on new firm entry, assuming that only the first one
invested. They note that when the market is unregulated, the incumbent operator sets
the access charge to prevent new entrant, which leads to a socially inefficient level in the
3Two firms compete on the Hotelling line (Hotelling, 1929).
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market. But access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also
inducing a socially inefficient outcome.
III. Theoretical gravity model for FDI
Gravity model, is increasingly used when investigating determinants of FDI flows4.
Head and Ries (2008) provide theoretical micro-foundations for a gravitational model of
FDI and motivate its application for modelling bilateral FDI as well as trade flows.
The framework used in this paper is based on recent advances in the literature on
gravitational models (see Yotov et al., 2016). In particular, we apply the gravity modeling
approach for FDI developed by Anderson et al (2016, 2017). Indeed, their model shows
how trade and FDI are linked and how they respond to natural or man-made barriers to
trade and investment.
In particular, Anderson et al (2016, 2017) model focuses on the interpretation of FDI
based on technological capital or knowledge capital. A given stock of technological
capital (patents, plans, management skills, etc.) can be used simultaneously in more
than one country. The value of knowledge capital increases when it can be "leased"
to other countries as FDI. Since knowledge capital flows are largely intangible and
therefore difficult to measure, bilateral FDI stock will be used as a proxy indicator of
knowledge capital flows between two countries.
FDI from country i to country j is as follows: FDIstockij . It is positively influenced by
the size of source country (Ei), as large economies tend to invest more in technological
capital. The stock of bilateral FDI is also positively influenced by the size of destination
country (Yj), as large economies can in principle absorb more foreign technology. If the
size of the aggregate stock of technological capital in country i is denoted by Mi, the
ratio YiMi can be considered as a gross measure of the potential absorptive capacity of
country j for FDI-related technological capital from country i. FDI flows are impeded by
obstacles or frictions. For FDI, the relative openness of country j to foreign technologies
can be represented by ij, which has values from 0 to 1. If wij = 1, country j is fully
open to the entry of technological capital from country i, while in the case of wij =
0, no technological capital from country i is allowed. All these factors are the main
determinants of the bilateral stock of FDI 5.
FDIstockij = w
η
ij
αEi
Pi
Yi
Mj
(1)
Wth Ei measures the size of country i as a total expenditure, including expenditures for
the development of technological capital; Yj is a measure of the size of host country j.
The parameter η is the elasticity of FDI revenue flows with respect to the measure of
openness. More openness in country j will lead to more frequent use of the technology
stock, which will lead to an increase of FDI revenues. The other elements of equation (1)
come from the structural gravity system for trade, in which the FDI determinants are
4Wei (2000) or Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007).
5Time indices are omitted in this representation.
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integrated. α groups a set of fixed parameters from the theoretical model6. Finally, Pi is
the inward multilateral resistance term of the gravity trade model. They aggregate the
bilateral trade costs of country i with all other countries:
Pi =
[
N
∑
j=1
(
tji
Πj
)1−σ Yj
Y
] 1
1−σ
(2)
With tji represents the bilateral trade-cost frictions (bilateral distance, having different
languages, common border..) that increase bilateral trade cost. Y = ∑Yj is world
production or world GDP, used to normalize the size of destination country (Yj), and
σ is the elasticity of substitution from CES functions used to aggregate multilateral
resistance (MR) terms 7.
World trade is a fully integrated system, equation (2) also contains the term Πj, which
represents the outward multilateral trade resistances of country j. It aggregates the
bilateral trade costs of country j with respect to all other countries. The gravity system
of the FDI becomes:
Πj =
[
N
∑
j=1
(
tji
¶i
)1−σ
Ei
Y
] 1
1−σ
(3)
Equation (3) shows that if trade costs increase in host country j, domestic prices rise and
thus reduce the country’s real potential to absorb foreign technological capital.
The author has highlighted the gravity estimation of bilateral FDI remains Bénassy-
Quéré et al 2005. The latter study the impacts of FDI determinants on horizontal FDI.
In the model, bilateral FDI stocks depend on both economies’ GDP, the determinants
of supply and demand, and the distance between capital. However, recent theoret-
ical developments have provided other foundations for the application of a gravity
model to other FDI models, Kleinert and Toubal, 2010; Carr, Markusen and Maskus,
2001; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Head and Ries, 20088. Bergstrand and Egger, 2007
implement a gravity model of FDI by including several aspects of FDI (foreign direct
investment (FDI), foreign affiliate sales (FAS) and multinational companies (MNEs).
However, Head and Ries, 2008 develop a gravity model of FDI by considering the M&A
process, in which the holding company tries to control the assets abroad.
Anderson et al (2016, 2017) also include the impacts of FDI on domestic welfare in origin
and destination countries through the process of capital accumulation and the creation
of a wider variety of products or more efficient production. In this paper we do not
consider this mechanism but focus on the effects of restrictive standards on FDI flows.
The gravity study of FDI identified two types of obstacles that affect bilateral FDI. First,
there are standard bilateral trade barriers (tji), covered by the common control variables
of the gravity model (Free Trade Agreement (FTA), distance, common border, common
6These include parameters such as the depreciation rate, the utility function discount factor and other
parameters that are used in the underlying theoretical model. See Anderson et al (2016, 2017).
7With σ > 1, the elasticity of substitution shows that all countries have a preference for a variety of
products and technological capital by origin country.
8The studies combine both horizontal and vertical FDI.
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language and colonial ties), which indirectly act as barriers to foreign direct investment.
Second, there are the explicit barriers to FDI addressed by the FDI openness measure
wij. These include specific FDI barriers such as bureaucracy, protection of national
champions, protected industries and other restrictive measures, as well as the impact of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and currency unions.
IV. Data description
To analyse the effects of FDI restrictions on FDI stocks between OECD countries, we
use panel data between 36 OECD countries from 2010 to 2017. Indeed, we use OECD
countries because inward and outward FDI respectively represent around 40% and 44%
of GDP. Annual data over the period 2010-2017 to explain the decline of inward FDI
since 2016. Finally, we use data on the deregulation of labour, business, investment and
financial markets to capture their effects on FDI (which is a new area of research). Our
dependant variable is aggregate bilateral FDI stock. The data are collected on OECD
Foreign Direct Investment Statistics 9. The data cover a range of advanced and emerging
countries in terms of origin and destination. However, we use the latest version set up
by the OECD 10. This database highlights bilateral FDI between OECD member and
non-member countries and runs from 2005 to 2017. It also highlights bilateral sectoral
FDI (primary, manufacturing and services sectors). Missing data (or non-reported,
suppressed) and negative FDI are replaced by 0 in our case, because negative values are
interpreted as disinvestment and to have a balanced panel, Kox, L.and Rojas, H (2019).
We consider the specific characteristics of the destination country that impact FDI such
as political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality (data available on
Worldwide Governance Indicators).
FDI determinants in destination countries such as investment freedom, tax burden,
labour freedom, business freedom, financial freedom index are collected on The Heritage
Foundation11. The data of environmental restriction measured by OECD’s environmental
policy stringency Index (EPS), unit labor cost, labour productivity are collected on
OECD.stat. Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption)
extracted on World Bank database, human capital index in Penn World Table database
of Groningen Growth and Development Centre12, logistics performance index (LPI)
on World Bank database. The data of starting business, enforcing contracts, resolving
insolvency extrated from doing business database. Data of real effective exchange rate
from World Bank database.
Our interest variable is FDI restrcj,t that captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI. We
use FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD. Indeed, this variable measures the
restrictiveness of the policies implemented in the FDI sector in 70 countries (36 OECD
countries and 34 non-OECD countries). It gauges the restrictiveness of a country’s FDI
rules by looking at the four main types of restrictions on FDI:
• Foreign equity limitations.
• Screening or approval mechanisms.
9https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=64194.
10Benchmark Definition 4th Edition (BMD4).
11https://www.heritage.org/index/.
12This index refers to the number of years of schooling and return on education.
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• Restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel.
• Operational restrictions, e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital repatriation
or on land ownership.
Restrictions are evaluated on a 0 (open) to 1 (closed) scale. Data are available for 1997,
2003 and 2006 and uninterrupted annual data for the period 2010-2018. Data collected
from OECD.Stat.
In addition, there are the traditional country-specific variables: GDP and trade openess
of importing country, (World Bank database). Bilateral resistance variables such as the
bilateral distance between the two capitals, common border, common language in CEPII
database, binary variables that materialize bilateral investment treaties on Investment
Policy Hub of UNCTADinvestment.
V. Estimated model
This section discusses appropriate estimation approaches for gravity equation. Indeed,
there are many challenges to ensure an unbiased and consistent estimate with the
theoretical foundations of the gravity equation. We follow the approach of Yotov et al.
(2016).
Firstly to take into account zero FDI and the presence of heteroskedasticity, we use a
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML), Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Indeed according to the literature, this type of estimator considers the zero FDIs. But
PPML does not work in the presence of a negative value of the dependent variable and
therefore we replace the negative values by zero FDIs.
Second, to obtain a consistent estimate, our model must contain source-time fixed
effects, Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Feenstra, 2004. Indeed, these fixed effects capture
the outward multilateral FDI resistance terms and size effects such as gravity, but also
other determinants of home country that are not considered in the specific model13. We
cannot take the host country’s time-fixed effects because our paper attempts to see the
impacts of FDI restrictions in the destination country on inward FDI. The inclusion of
these time fixed effects will absorb the effects of FDI restrcj,t in our regression. These
country-time fixed effects would be included in our various robustness tests with our
bilateral interest variables.
Last, to control the endogeneity between the FDI restrictions and the dependent vari-
able, the empirical literature suggests to include country-pair fixed effects (ij) in our
regressions, Anderson and Yotov, 2011; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007. These pair country
fixed effects eliminate, respectively, the unobservable linkages between the endogenous
variable and the error term in gravity regressions. In addition, the country-pair fixed ef-
fects control bilateral trade costs after controlling for both observable and time-invariant
bilateral trade flow factors, Yotov et al (2016). However, our paper does not focus on
the effects of trade policies (BIT, FTA, bilateral tariff) and we cannot consider these
pair-country fixed effects. To reduce the endogeneity bias between the FDI restriction
variable and bilateral FDI, we used the instrumental variable approach discussed in the
section 9.
13We have: GDPs, population, most favored nation (MFN) tariffs.
9
VI. Main Regression Equation
In our empirical analysis, we examine the influence of investment restrictions on FDI
stocks between OECD countries. However, the aim of this paper is to examine the effects
of FDI determinants particularly FDI restrictions on FDI stocks. The determinants of
FDI are important when studying the effects of its factors. It is necessary to identify
the type of determinants of FDI to conduct this empirical study. According to the
literature, two approaches can be used to determine the explanatory factors of FDI:
a macroeconomic approach based on modern international trade theories to explain
the location of multinational production or an enterprise-level approach based on
microeconomic theories of firms to explain why and which firms are more likely to
invest abroad.
These two approaches examine characteristics that are either endogenous to the firm,
such as management expertise, technological skills, firm size, etc., which are ownership
advantages that can be exploited abroad, Hymer, 1976; Dunnin, 1973. Also exogenous
characteristics that influence a firm’s FDI decisions, such as market size and labour costs,
which imply some location advantages for establishment in a host country (Helpman,
1984; Markusen, 1984; Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001, and Bergstrand and Egger,
2007). Such models generally explain the activity of firms on the foreign market,
particularly the sales of foreign affiliates (horizontal FDI), rather than FDI as cross-
border investment flows (vertical FDI). Due to missing data on foreign affiliates, we
decided to use FDI stock data in our study. Indeed, these FDI stocks represent a fairly
consistent approximation of the level of activity of foreign affiliates, as evidenced by
the strong correlation between FDI stock data and real activity data of multinational
enterprises (Lipsey, 2007). Through a gravity analysis we will analyse the different
impacts of FDI determinants on FDI stocks, with a particular focus on the restrictive
barriers to FDI. All factors that can influence bilateral FDI in our analysis are:
The first component is related to characteristics of the origin or source country of FDI.
Determinants include labour costs, corporate tax rates, corruption and red tape. These
factors may vary over time.
The second includes FDI factors that are related to the destination or host country.
The most relevant determinants for incoming FDI are political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, trade openess, labour freedom, logistic performance
index, human capital and taxe burden. These factors are also time variables.
The third has bilateral determinants that are invariable in time, characteristic of gravity
standard analysis: distance, common border, common language. These factors tend
not to change over time. The last category includes bilateral determinants of FDI that
vary over time. These include Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment
Agreements (BITs) in force 14; Reel Effective Exchange Rate (REER); common currencies
and custom unions.
In our analysis we consider components 2, 3, 4.
14BITs warns foreign investors against risks on the host market through instruments such as protection
from expropriation, free transfer of means, fair and equitable treatment, foreign investors fair and equitable,
non-discriminatory, most-favoured-nation and national treatment.
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Following Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003), the control of trade costs remains
crucial in order to properly specify the gravity equation. However, trade costs are
very important for the gravity equation. That is, two countries will trade or invest
less if they were separated by an ocean or by vast stretches of deserts and mountains.
Trade and invest between two nations are determined by relative trade costs, i.e. trade
costs between the two nations (absolute costs) and trade costs between the country
(importer, exporter) and the rest of the world, which will be called the MTR (Multilateral
Trade-Resistance). Considering all these factors, our gravity equation is as follows:
FDIijt = exp[β0 + β1FDIij,t−1 + β2Zij,t + β3tij + β4LnFDIrestrjt + β5Xjt + αit + ǫij,t]
(4)
With FDIijt the FDI stocks from country i (the reporting country) to country j (the
partner country) in period t (2010-2017)=
FDIijt
GDPde f lator(it)
. The real FDI stocks are calculated
by dividing the net FDI stocks (U.S.$) by the source country GDP deflator (2010) to
remove inflation. FDIij,t−1 is one-year lagged dependent variable, Egger and Merlo
(2007) 15. Zijt is a time-variant vector of bilateral policy variables: real effective exchange
rate (REER)16 and bilateral investment treaties (BIT), FDIrestrjt captures the level of
FDI restrictions in the destination country. We use the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness
Index of OECD. tij : the vector of time-invariant bilateral control variables (i.e. bilateral
distance, common language, common border). Xjt includes destination country specific
characteristics (political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality) and
FDI determinants in destination country such as trade openess, labour productivity
measured by GDP per hour worked (U.S dollars), labour freedom index, financial
freedom index, investment freedom index, business freedom index, renewable energy,
environmental restrictions, human capital index (education), unit labor cost, logistic
performance, tax burden, unit labor tax). αit represents source-country fixed effect
(dummy variables that control the outward multilateral resistance terms and countries’
output shares) and ǫijt is a error term. Source-country fixed effect reduce the risk of
omitted variable bias. Standard errors are clustered by country pairs to control for
potential heteroskedasticity and to limit the potential effect of persistence over time of
FDI stock levels in each pair of countries, see Fournier (2015). β4 is the coefficient of
interest; according to the litterature it is negative, Ghosh et al (2012), Fournier (2015).
VII. FDI gravity results
This section presents and analyzes the empirical results. The results are reported in
Tables A.4, and A.5. The tables contain the regressions with source year fixed effects.
Table A.4, which represents the baseline results, contains firstly the characteristics of the
destination countries (political factors, columns 1, 2, 3) and secondly the determinants
of FDI (socio-economic factors, columns 4, 5, 6 and 7). Table A.5 highlights the effects of
services liberalization and environmental restrictions on FDI stocks.
15They argue that ignoring the dynamic nature of FDI could lead to an overestimation of the effect of
bilateral factors.
16Bilateral exchange rate between home country and trading partners. A rise is a depreciation of the home
country’s currency.
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i. Baseline results
We estimate the effects of FDI restrictions on bilateral FDI stock. Using a gravity model
with PPML as estimate, the baseline results are presented in Table A.4. In the different
specifications, we find the following effects:
The lagged FDI variable has a positive and significant impact of FDI. Bilateral invest-
ments treaties (BIT) have negative and significant effects on FDI stocks. Distance between
capitals of the two countries has negative and significant effects17 and our dummy vari-
able, common language has a positive and significant impact on FDI.
If both countries have signed bilateral agreement on investment, the effect is negative
and significant on inward FDI stocks. The BIT has different characteristics from the
FTA, it protects the investor against risks on the market receiving FDI. It therefore
establishes transparency on the host country, Bergstrand and Egger, 2013. These agree-
ments between developed countries and emerging or developing countries (North-South
investment) have much greater effects than North-North agreement Kox, L. and Rojas,
H (2019). FDI has contradictory properties compared to trade in goods. Depending on
its structure (horizontal and vertical), FDI can substitute or compliment goods trade. In
our case it appears as a substitute for trade in goods. Like the FTAs, bilateral investment
agreements have a more positive impact on vertical investment (fragmented production)
than horizontal investment.
The real effective exchange rate (REER) has significant negative effects on FDI. Indeed,
an increase of REER implies an appreciation of foreign currency (host country) against
the home country’s currency. More the host currency appreciates, more the factors of
production are important in this country compared to the origin country. Also, the
appreciation of the host currency relative to home country increases the value of assets
in that country. As a result, production costs and asset prices are higher in the receiving
country, which leads to less inward FDI, Asmah and Andoh, 2013. This variable captures
location competitiveness through currency fluctuation
The effects of destination country-specific characteristics on FDI stocks. We regressed
FDI restrictions on FDI stocks in the presence of global governance indicators. The
factors such as stability, good governance and regulatory quality attract more FDI in the
destination country, Berden et al. (2014), and Dellis et al. (2017). The columns 1, 2 and 3
of table A.4 show that political stability, government efficiency and regulatory quality
respectively increase bilateral FDI by 0.24, 0.23 and 0.26% for FDI. Therefore, to attract
more capital, importing countries must implement more competitive standards through
democratic governance.
If we consider the impacts of FDI determinants on FDI stocks we have: the trade ope-
ness and tax burden have a positive and significant impact on FDI. Indeed, variable
of tax burden measures the level of taxation in the destination country. Higher the
level of tax burden, lower the tax rate. It affects labour costs and has a significant
impact on FDI performance, KOX, L. and ROJAS, H (2019). Determinants such as
labour productivity, logistics performance, human capital are positive factors for FDI
17See Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) or Basile et al. (2008). Indeed, firms prefer closer locations due to
intra-company trade involved in the fragmentation of production.
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into the destination country. Indeed, reliable and efficient transport infrastructure (roads
and bridges, airports, ports & waterways and communication networks) can improve
transport accessibility and reduce transport costs. Firms benefit from these factors.
Lower transport costs due to accessibility, have a positive impact on firms’ productivity
and profitability, Shahbaz, M and al (2019). The labour productivity is a competitiveness
factor, including a significant return on FDI. The positive impact of the human capital
variable is similar to the knowledge capital model (Carr et al. (2001)). The more a
population is well educated, more skilled labour is available and more investment is
profitable
If we look at our control variabl, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, despite FDI
barriers declining since the 1980s in OECD countries, we have a negative and significant
impact of this variable on FDI stocks. This is explained by barriers to entry in some
sectors that hamper potential productivity gains at the economic level. By hindering
competition in the service sectors, for example, restrictions consequently contribute
to increasing services input costs (financing and logistics) for other economic sectors.
Access to world-class inputs through FDI has been crucial to move the manufacturing
up the value chain and stimulate growth and employment in the services sector (OECD,
2015, 2018). Also, inward FDI restrictions are implemented to protect domestic firms
from foreign competition with large financial resources and production capacity 18. A
1% increase in restrictions leads to a decrease in FDI stocks of almost 0.8%. However,
these results should be treated very carefully as the effects vary across countries. Indeed
the effects of restrictions on FDI are not the same on a country like Luxembourg which
has implemented liberal reforms or European Union countries with free movement of
goods, services and investments as a country like Canada or New Zealand where the
restrictions are higher.
ii. Service liberalization and environmental restrictions results
Investment and financial freedom index have positive and significant effects on FDI
(see Table A.5). In the most open countries, FDI is more attractive. In addition, The
liberalization of these sectors is very important to attract investment, as it allows for
a better absorption of the benefits arising from the presence of multinational firms,
(technology and process transfer, professional labour force development, benefits from
global value chains), Edgars Roz˜âns (2016). Regulation of the labour market has no
significant effect on FDI.
The renewable energy consumption has negative effects on inward FDI stocks, while
strict environmental policies have positive impacts on inward FDI stocks, see Table
A.6. Indeed, countries with very strict environmental policies attract more FDI. OECD
countries increased restrictions in their environmental policies in the 2000s. Investors
look for investment routes having stable and stringent environmental regulations. If
regulations are fluctuating, then the investor or business has to adapt and rapidly
change its environmental commitments, Rahul, R and P.K. Viswanathan (2018). FDI
contributes to reduction of oil energy use through environmental policies in force, Sbia
et al. (2014). Firms have to develop appropriate technology that permits to produce at
18To ensure the assimilation of cutting edge technologies by national firms.
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lower costs with less pollution. We have a positive impact of environmental regulation
on innovation and inward FDI stocks.
VIII. Robustness check
In this section, we evaluate the sensitivity of estimation results through several robust-
ness tests. We perform different tests to validate the strength of our results.
i. Impact of sectoral FDI restrictions on FDI stocks
The study of FDI restrictions on FDI should take into account the effects of sectoral FDI
restrictions. A robustness check is performed by considering the FDI restrictiveness
indicators in the manufacturing, financial and banking sector19. We also consider foreign
equity restrictions20 and restrictions on cross-border financial transactions through the
Kaopen index21. We investigate the impact of its restrictions on FDI stocks and FDI
income.
The results are shown in Tables A.7, A.8 and A.9.
Its suggest negative and significant effects of sectoral FDI restrictions, more strongly in
the services sector (banking plus financial). The liberalization of financial transactions
has positive and significant effects on FDI and the foreign equity restrictions have
negative impact on FDI. Services FDI inflows are much higher than manufacturing FDI
in OECD countries. Restrictions in this sector have significant negative impacts on FDI.
ii. Regulatory difference, doing business variables, factors endow-
ments
To see the real effects of restrictions on FDI, we consider the regulatory difference
between pairs of countries. This regulatory difference variable captures the variation of
restrictions between countries over time. Countries with stable regulatory policy regimes
and those with high or low restrictions. It also helps to understand why a firm invests
more in a given country than in another or in the home country. It is computed by
taking the difference between FDI restrictions in the host country and home country. We
use both destination country-specific variables and FDI determinants in our regressions
in these robustness tests. We consider the variables whose impact on FDI remains
important according to Table A.4 ( regulatory quality, trade openness, education, and
productivity). The results presented in table A.10, column 2, show significant negative
effects of the regulatory disparity on inward FDI. In column 3, we construct a dummy
variable equals 1 if the regulatory difference is negative and 0 if it is positive. The
negative value stipulates greater restrictions in the source country than host country
and the positive value explains the opposite effect. Our estimation shows positive and
non significant effects of this variable on inward FDI. The fourth regression considers
19Data from OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Indexd database.
20FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Indexd database.
21The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country’s degree of capital account openness,
Chinn and Ito (2006).
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the average of FDI restrictions among all host countries. The regulatory difference was
constructed by the difference between each country’s restrictions and the average. The
countries whose restrictions are close to the average are less restrictive and those that
deviate from the average are closed to FDI. The results are negative and significant. The
regulatory difference is essential for foreign investment. A firm or investor compares
the restrictions of their country with importing country’s restrictions. If the disparity
is important, it has a strong impact on investment. However, the firm invests more in
countries where the restrictions are less stringent.
In regression 5, we exclude from our estimates the five countries with a large share of
inward FDI in GDP22. The results show negative and insignificant effects of restrictions
on inward FDI, underlining the correlation between FDI restrictions and inward FDI.
The estimations of the Doing Business variables23 (starting business, resolving insolvency
and enforcing contracts) show positive and significant effects on FDI (Cf. Table A.7).
Firms are most likely to locate in countries where entry and exit costs are very lower
and legal rules are very stringent.
The last test includes the difference in factor endowment. Indeed, the difference in
factor endowment can affect inward FDI, Ethier and Markusen (1996). A firm may be
vertically integrated and need factors of production at different stages of production
or horizontally integrated and therefore require similar factors of production in the
host country. The difference in factor endowment has important effects on the second
case. Differences in factor endowments are represented by factor dissimilarity (FD) and
human capital dissimilarity (HCD), Golub et al (2003):
FDijt =| (lnGDP per capitajt − lnGDP per capitait) | (5)
HCDij,t =| (ln(educationjt − ln(educationit) | (6)
The difference in factor endowment has negative and significant effects on FDI. Firms
locate in countries with the same factor endowments as the origin country.
iii. Construction of dependent variable: zero-negative FDI and
other transformations
We test the robustness of our findings by considering negative and zero FDI. The table
above shows that 30% of the FDI data are zero and almost 3% are negative 24. Several
transformations of the dependent variable and other estimates than the PPML will be
done in this section.
Table 1: Zero and Negative FDI Data
Positive(%) Zeroes(%) Negative(%) Total
FDI 68.1349 29.2757 2.5892 100
No. o f observations 6,868 2,951 261 10080
22Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Switzerland.
23Doing Business database.
24Missing data are replaced by zero.
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First, we log-linearize and include 1 in the dependent variable and replace negative
FDIs by 0. Using OLS as an estimator, Column 2 of Table A.11 shows the results and
confirms our findings.
Second, based on analysis of Magee (2008), Liu (2009), and Cheong et al. (2015),
we use a Conditional Poisson Maximum Pseudo-Likelihood (CPPML) estimator to
incorporate host-source country fixed effects into the PPML estimator. The inclusion of
both source and host country fixed effects controls the inward and outward multilateral
FDI resistance terms, Baier and Bergstrand 2007. However, the CPPML estimator does
not converge when we include source-country time fixed effects. This is probably due
to the number of dummy variables too large. Thus, we control for time-fixed effects
instead of source-country time-fixed effects to avoid the convergence issue. Column 3 of
Table A.11 shows that FDI restrictions still discourage FDI inflows.
Third, to capture negative FDI in our estimate, we use the transformation by Busse
and Hefeker (2007),Yeyati et al (2007), and Azzimonti (2019). This dependent variable
transformation includes negative values of FDI: FDI∗ij,t = Ln(FDIij,t +
√
1+ FDI2ij,t).
Compared to our baseline, column 4 shows significant and negative impacts of FDI
restrictions on inward FDI.
Fourth, we normalize inward FDI by the lagged one-year GDP in the host country to
control the economic significance of inward FDI in growth episodes. Column 5 gives
negative and significant results of restrictions on FDI. Last, we normalize FDI by the
average of country pair GDP deflators (home and host countries). The last column of
Table A.11 confirms our results that FDI restrictions have negative effects on inward
FDI.
iv. Host, Source and Difference FDI restrictions: Comparaison
Our analysis so far suggests that host country FDI restrictions are a push factor for
inward FDI and therefore ignores its relevance as a pull factor. The objective in this
section is to study the effects of home country FDI restrictions on FDI. We first analyze
the role of home country FDI restrictions on FDI. Controlling for time and country fixed
effects our equation becomes:
FDIij,t = exp[β0 + β1FDIij,t−1 + β2Zij,t + β3tij + β4Ln FDIrestri,t + β5Ln FDIrestrj,t+
β6Xit + β7Xjt + αt + αi + αj + ǫij,t]
(7)
Where αt is a time-fixed effects, αi, αj Source-host fixed effects and Xit,Xjt Source-host
controls variables.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table A.12 summarize the results from estimating Equation 7 by
varying the scope of control variables and PPML as the estimate 25. Column 3 shows that
home and host country restrictions have significant negative effects on FDI. The results
are robust after controlling the FDI determinants and country-specific variables in the
host and home countries. Indeed, FDI restrictions are considered as barriers to market
entry for new firms. High restrictions lead to market foreclosure and high market prices,
25To save space, the coefficients of all the control variables are not reported.
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which is profitable for established firms that find the domestic investments is beneficial,
Brito et al (2010); Manenti and Scialà (2013). Therefore, higher restrictions lead to a
decline of home country outward FDI and an increase of domestic investment. FDI
restrictions are perceived as barriers to entry supported by the domestic private sector.
Restrictions on FDI are regulatory protections for incumbent firms. They affect potential
domestic and foreign entrants.
The effect of FDI restrictions on FDI could be a nonlinear function. Indeed, the decision to
invest may depend both the restrictions in the source and host country. The assumption
here is that even if host country restrictions are high, a firm’s foreign investment into
the host country might be less affected when the firm is already subject to a high
restriction in its home country. In contrast, if domestic restrictions are lower, a firm may
not tolerate severe restrictions in the destination country. This idea is widely used in
the literature and refers to the effect of the so-called "corruption distance", Wu, 2006;
Qian and Sandoval-Hernandez, 2016. The difference between the level of restrictions
in the two countries discourages FDI due to the additional costs of new or stricter
restrictions. However, the effect of the difference in restrictions between countries
decreases with individual country restrictions. To capture the effects of the difference
in restrictions taking into account the effects of countries restrictions, we estimate the
following equation:
FDIij,t = exp[γ0 + γ1FDIij,t−1 + γ2Zij,t + γ3tij + (γ4 + γ5FDIrestrj,t + γ6FDIrestri,t)Di f f restrij,t
+αit + αjt + ǫij,t]
(8)
Where Di f f restrij,t is "corruption distance" =|FDIrestrj,t − FDIrestri,t|, αit, αjt Source-
host time fixed effects26 , γ4 shows the effect on FDI of a similarity of restrictions
between home and host countries, γ5 and γ6 reflect the impact of the difference in FDI
restrictions between countries in presence of host and source countries FDI restrictions.
A positive coefficient of γ5 and γ6 implies that the negative effect of the difference in
FDI restrictions between countries declines with the level of host and home country FDI
restrictions, Wu, 2006 27. Columns 4 of Table A.12 show negative and significant effects
of the difference in FDI restrictions between host and source countries on FDI.
More interesting, we have a negative and insignificant sign of our interaction term
between the restriction difference and the host country restrictions. In contrast, we
have a negative and significant result for the interaction term between the restriction
difference and home country restrictions (Column 6 of Table A.12). Results opposite
to Wu, 2006. The negative sign indicates that the difference in FDI restrictions between
countries increases with the level of FDI home country restrictions. Even if home country
restrictions are high, the investor or the multinational firm will compare the difference
in FDI restrictions between his country and the host country. If the difference is less
important they will invest and if the disparity is important they will have a disincentive
to invest. This confirms the idea that the disparity of restrictions between countries is the
first factor considered by firms or investors and not the level of restrictions in home and
26We include country time fixed effects to address the risk of omitted variables and to consider FDI
Multilateral resistance.
27Wu, 2006 studies the effects of corruption on cross-border investments by multinational firms.
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host countries. The difference in FDI restrictions between countries has greater negative
effects than individual home country restrictions because home country FDI restrictions
are very attractive for domestic investments, in this case it is necessary to compare the
restrictions of two countries. This study concludes that there exists a substitutability
between domestic and foreign investments in the presence of FDI restrictions.
IX. Endogeneity Problem: Reverse Causality
The crucial econometric issue in estimating gravity model is the endogeneity between
trade policy variables and bilateral FDI. Indeed, we have a reverse causality between our
FDI restrictiveness variables and bilateral FDI. Countries with low or no FDI restrictions
have large FDI inflows and inverse effect. In this case the gravity estimate is biased
in the presence of reverse causality28. To solve this problem, we use the instrumental
variable approach.
Restrictions on FDI have negative effects on competition between firms and positive
effects on incumbent firms’ investments, Brito et al (2010), Manenti and Scialà (2013). As
a result, high restrictions boost domestic firms’ investments. Our instrumental variable
is Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), which captures domestic firms’ investments
in fixed capital. This variable is clearly correlated with the endogenous variable but has
no effect on bilateral FDI. Luxembourg and Belgium, which have the highest inward
FDI, have lower domestic investments, which led to liberalisation of their FDI sector.
However, foreign investment is not linked to domestic investment but to factors such as
tax exemptions and the european common market. We have a correlation between our
instrument and the endogenous variable and no effect on dependent variable.
Our instrument can be considered as exogenous as it does not affect inward FDI. The
exclusion restriction of our instrument is valid and linked to the fact that domestic
firms’ investment does not affect inward FDI. FDI liberalization finances debt, stimulates
competition and therefore innovation. However, more restrictions protect domestic firms
from competition and increase investment.
Using instrumental variables (2SLS) regression, the results are presented in Table A.13.
The results are robust. The Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests are significant, showing that
the restrictiveness variable is endogenous. Thus the OLS estimate is biased. The high
F-statistic (>10) suggests that our instrument is strong, Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).
In this case the 2SLS estimation with fixed effect gives small biases.
X. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has examined the impacts of FDI restrictions on FDI stocks in OECD countries.
Using panel data for all OECD countries from 2010-2017, FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness
Index of OECD and gravity model, we highlighted the effects of FDI restrictions on
FDI stock. The results indicate that FDI restrictions significantly reduce bilateral FDI.
In constrast deregulation of the investment and finance sectors significantly increase
FDI stocks. Environmental restrictions also have positive and significant effects on FDI.
28FDI restrj,t is endogenous in our study.
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Renewable energy is not the most attractive type of energy for FDI.
The results seem robust to alternative specifications. Several aspects were analyzed.
First, we estimate the effects of sectoral FDI restrictions, foreign equity restriction and
cross-border financial transaction restrictions on bilateral FDI stocks. We find a negative
and significant impact on FDI, stronger in the service sector. Second test highlight the
negative impact of the regulatory difference between countries on FDI and the positive
effects of the doing business variables on FDI. Last, Home FDI restrictions have negative
effects on FDI and our test also shows that the regulatory disparity of FDI is the most
important factor that investors consider.
This study is an extension of previous studies based on the impacts of FDI restrictions on
FDI stocks. However, it differs from previous studies in that we examine FDI restrictions
on FDI through original quantitative tools and various estimates. We use the new OECD
bilateral FDI database and a very recent FDI restrictiveness index. It departs from recent
literature as we highlight the factors explaining the decline in FDI since 2016 and the
effet of services deregulation on FDI.
From this study, it emerges that restrictions are public policies considered as barriers to
entry in favour of domestic private sector. Market regulation leads to a decrease in both
inward and outward investment benefiting domestic investment. The implementation of
future restrictions depends on the penetration rate of firms or multinationals. Countries
with large shares of inward FDI in GDP growth will implement liberal policies and sub-
sidies to firms. These measures will encourage more competition between firms. Case
of Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands... However, countries with domestic investment
as a major contribution to GDP will impose restrictions to hinder entry of new firms in
order to stimulate domestic private investment.
We cannot implement a policy that stimulates both competition and investment between
firms.
We could improve our study by considering several types of FDI, namely financial FDI
and M&A. However, there are some important limitations mainly related to data. First,
the restrictions on FDI have certain limitations, including the fact that they are invariable
over time for certain sectors. Second, it would be really interesting to also consider
domestic investments to future research.
From this study, we conclude that the drop of inward FDI in OECD countries since 2016
is due to a rise of restrictive and protectionist policies in order to protect local firms. It
is also the result of Donald Trump’s tax cuts since 2017. This measure led to repatriation
of profits into United States. This decrease is probably due to the trade war between
China and United States, which has a considerable effect on production and investment
in global value chains.
From our findings, we can formulate policy implications to reduce the restrictive effects
of FDI restrictions: The first is to liberalize services sector whose restrictions have
significant negative effects on FDI. Also reduce foreign equity restrictions that limit the
entry of foreign capital.
Second, deregulate investment sector with a high quality legal system. Our estimates
suggest that countries with a flexible investment sector and institutions that guarantee
the enforcement of contracts had significant and positive effect on FDI inflows.
19
The optimal policy should be to lower entry barriers and exit costs. Our results show
that firms locate in countries where entry costs are lower with the better insolvency
laws.
All these policies must be combined with a strict environmental policy against environ-
mental degradation.
20
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Table A. 1: Variable description and sources
Variables Description Source
FDIij,t Aggregate bilateral greeneld investments OECD.stat
BITij,t Is a dummy that indicates whether both countries
have an investment agreement in force UNCTADinvestment
borderij Takes the value 1 when countries share
a common border, and 0 otherwise CEPII
langij Takes the value 1 when countries share
a common border, and 0 otherwise CEPII
Ln distij Distance in kilometers between country capitals CEPII
FDIrestrj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on all sectors OECD.stat
FDIrestrmanuj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on manufacturing sector OECD.stat
FDIrestr f inanj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on financial sector OECD.stat
FDIrestrbank j,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on banking sector OECD.stat
Ln GDPj,t Importer country GDP (constant 2010 US) World Bank database
Trade openessj,t Sum of imports and exports normalized by GDP World Bank database
Unit labor costj,t Index that measures the average cost of labour
per unit of output produced (2015) OECD.stat
Productivityj,t Labour productivity measured by GDP per hour worked (U.S dollars) OECD.stat
REERijt Real Effective Exchange Rate World Bank database
Politiq stabj,t Index that measures perceptions of the likelihood of
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated
violence, including terrorism World Governance
indicators
Gov e f f ectivj,t Index that measures the quality of public services
and credibility of the government’s commitment World Governance
indicators
Regul qualityj,t Index that captures the ability of the government
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations World Governance
indicators
Tax burdenj,t Measures the tax burden imposed by the government Heritage Foundation
Labour f reedomj,t Index that measures the legal and regulatory framework
of a country’s labour market Heritage Foundation
Financial f reedomj,t Measures banking efficiency and independence from government
control in the financial sector ranging from 0 (high control) to 100 (Negligible government interference. )Heritage Foundation
Business f reedomj,t overall indicator of the efficiency Heritage Foundation
of government regulation of business, ranging from 0 (closed) to 100 (free)
Investment f reedomj,t Index measuring restrictions on flows of investment capital Heritage Foundation
ranging from 0 (high restrictions) to 100 (no restrictions)
Environ restricj,t Index that measures the stringency of environmental policy OECD.stat
range from 0 (not stringent) to 6 (highest degree of stringency)
Renewable energj,t % of total final energy consumption World Bank database
Logis per f orj,t Index that measures trade logistics performance
(road, port, rail, air infrastructure, etc..), ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) World Bank database
Educationj,t Index that measures the average years of schooling Penn World database
starting businessj,t Measures the entry cost paid by a small- or medium-sized firm to start up
and operate in the largest business city in each economy Doing business database
Resolving Insolvencyj,tMeasures the time, cost and outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic legal entities Doing business database
En f orcing contractsj,t Measures quality and efficiency in the court system Doing business database
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Variables obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bilateral FDI
FDIij,t 10,080 101.9283 428.3609 0 8340.064
Traditional variables of the gravity model
langij 10,080 .0587302 .2351306 0 1
borderij 10,080 .0642857 .2452734 0 1
Ln distij 10,080 3.469138 .5056796 1.775372 4.29195
BITij,t 10,080 .5978175 .4903627 0 1
GDPi,t 10,080 1.32e+12 2.78e+12 1.37e+10 1.73e+13
GDPj,t 10,080 1.32e+12 2.78e+12 1.37e+10 1.73e+13
Index of Economic Freedom
Tax burdenj,t 10,080 66.10834 12.69926 35.9 93.6
Business f reedomj,t 10,080 82.00543 17.85653 61 519.5
Invest f reedomj,t 10,080 78.71493 9.49992 50 95
Labour f reedomj,t 10,080 63.31076 15.55192 31 98.5
Finan f reedomj,t 10,080 70.10417 10.81733 40 90
Socio-economic factors
Educationj,t 10,080 3.303331 .346448 2.214366 3.807068
Ln Trade openessj,t 10,080 11.56388 .5641905 10.10975 12.68642
REERij,t 9,099 99.10728 9.415318 69.39654 154.1953
Productivityj,t 10,080 51.50111 17.47187 19.43301 97.66675
Worldwide Governance Indicators
Politiq stabj,t 10,080 .6706824 .6480735 -2.009063 1.587232
Regul qualityj,t 10,080 1.254318 .4893416 -.5067052 2.088636
Gov e f f ectivj,t 10,080 1.267461 .5361716 -.0299037 2.241138
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index
FDIrestrj,t 10,080 0.0661736 0.058583 0.004 0.24
FDIrestrmanuj,t 10,080 0.018375 0.0438353 0 0.2
FDIrestr f inanj,t 10,080 0.0341875 0.0499691 0 0.233
FDIrestrbank j,t 10,080 0.0371944 0.0648945 0 0.25
Equity restricj,t 10,080 .0378333 .0287328 .003 .14
Environmental Policy Stringency Index
Environ restricj,t 3,920 2.979353 .5351703 1.833333 4.133333
Renewable energj,t 7,560 20.18018 16.05634 1.314953 77.34468
Kaopen Index
Chinn− Ito indexj,t 9,800 1.908734 .8038244 -1.210019 2.346708
Doing Business Variables
En f orcing contractsj,t 7,141 68.98404 9.828041 42.38 85.7
Resolving insolvencyj,t 5,881 69.29771 22.77655 21.7 99.92
Starting businessj,t 9,381 88.97914 6.00097 68.88 99.96
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Table A.3: Cross-Correlation Table
Variables BIT lang border Ln dis FDI REER Politic Gov Regul Ln Trade Ln GDP Env Rena Business Inves Tax Labor Finan Logis Educ
restr stab e f f ec qual open restr energ f ree f ree burd f ree f ree per f
BIT 1.000
lang -0.151 1.000
border 0.110 0.292 1.000
Ln dis -0.459 -0.044 -0.388 1.000
FDI restr -0.336 0.090 -0.078 0.404 1.000
REER -0.030 -0.003 -0.029 0.071 -0.006 1.000
Politic stab -0.093 0.081 0.048 -0.098 -0.056 0.006 1.000
Gov e f f ec -0.225 0.127 -0.002 0.018 0.113 0.003 0.638 1.000
Regul qual -0.130 0.128 0.012 -0.029 0.004 0.003 0.501 0.741 1.000
Ln Trade open-0.033 0.130 0.078 0.061 0.028 -0.002 -0.120 0.124 0.132 1.000
Ln GDP -0.117 0.108 0.043 0.172 0.157 -0.001 -0.209 0.096 0.077 0.951 1.000
Env restr -0.078 0.085 0.024 -0.020 0.178 -0.008 0.447 0.522 0.650 0.262 0.212 1.000
Renab energ -0.152 -0.075 -0.024 -0.050 0.199 -0.009 0.357 0.270 0.161 -0.549 -0.453 0.133 1.000
Business f ree -0.099 0.045 -0.017 0.008 0.060 0.006 0.261 0.385 0.106 0.072 0.080 0.416 0.113 1.000
Inv f ree 0.111 0.082 0.008 -0.081 -0.151 -0.027 0.197 0.398 0.491 0.042 -0.102 0.225 -0.098 0.093 1.000
Tax burd -0.013 -0.044 -0.075 0.116 0.056 -0.003 -0.093 -0.336 -0.228 -0.340 -0.328 -0.342 -0.041 -0.266 -0.089 1.000
Labor f ree -0.220 0.121 -0.047 0.208 0.312 -0.001 0.220 0.359 0.294 0.208 0.240 0.231 -0.120 0.146 0.046 0.029 1.000
Finan f ree -0.011 0.123 -0.022 0.021 0.068 -0.004 0.325 0.493 0.587 0.094 0.021 0.460 -0.096 0.186 0.507 -0.121 0.385 1.000
Logis per f -0.083 0.154 0.067 -0.026 -0.025 -0.029 0.265 0.559 0.503 0.622 0.567 0.487 -0.150 0.350 0.328 -0.460 0.190 0.266 1.000
Educ -0.126 0.053 0.028 -0.048 0.043 -0.016 0.414 0.504 0.508 0.168 0.113 0.501 -0.069 0.109 0.287 -0.047 0.368 0.379 0.274 1.000
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Table A.4: Gravity Estimation Results of impacts of FDI Restrictions on FDI Stocks
Specification PPML Estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI Stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln FDI restrj -0.8062∗∗∗ -0.8149∗∗∗ -0.8367∗∗∗ -0.7550∗∗∗ -0.8469∗∗∗ -0.6084∗∗∗ -0.9732∗∗∗
(0.1132) (0.1152) (0.1163) (0.1196) (0.1160) (0.1068) (0.1451)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.4629∗∗∗ 1.4457∗∗∗ 1.4413∗∗∗ 1.4028∗∗∗ 1.4653∗∗∗ 1.4135∗∗∗ 1.0663∗∗∗
(0.0675) (0.0685) (0.0736) (0.0728) (0.0698) (0.0718) (0.0840)
BITij,t -0.3461∗∗∗ -0.3660∗∗∗ -0.3933∗∗∗ -0.4391∗∗∗ -0.4105∗∗∗ -0.2762∗∗∗ -0.5597∗∗∗
(0.0867) (0.0853) (0.0847) (0.0898) (0.0851) (0.0831) (0.1216)
LnGDPjt 0.5839∗∗∗ 0.5267∗∗∗ 0.5419∗∗∗ 0.4915∗∗∗ 0.4907∗∗∗ 0.5006∗∗∗
(0.0599) (0.0573) (0.0560) (0.0601) (0.0565) (0.0827)
langij 0.2698∗∗∗ 0.2599∗∗∗ 0.2390∗∗∗ 0.2937∗∗∗ 0.2635∗∗∗ 0.1915∗∗ 0.3989∗∗∗
(0.0761) (0.0798) (0.0800) (0.0780) (0.0880) (0.0766) (0.1091)
borderij -0.0913 -0.0661 -0.0481 -0.1126 -0.0611 -0.0227 -0.1171
(0.0772) (0.0813) (0.0793) (0.0824) (0.0826) (0.0737) (0.1182)
Lndistij -0.5978∗∗∗ -0.5931∗∗∗ -0.5919∗∗∗ -0.6385∗∗∗ -0.6028∗∗∗ -0.5474∗∗∗ -0.8532∗∗∗
(0.0874) (0.0900) (0.0868) (0.0952) (0.0912) (0.0882) (0.1252)
LnREERij,t -3.1726∗∗∗ -2.9778∗∗∗ -2.8207∗∗∗ -3.1988∗∗∗ -2.9142∗∗∗ -2.9097∗∗∗ -4.1660∗∗∗
(0.7758) (0.8048) (0.7791) (0.8484) (0.7747) (0.7548) (1.0786)
Politiq stabj,t 0.2423∗∗∗
(0.0616)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.2355∗∗∗
(0.0554)
Regul qualityj,t 0.2593∗∗∗
(0.0616)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.6206∗
(0.3755)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.8438∗∗∗
(0.0938)
Ln unit labor costj,t -0.0921
(0.8433)
Ln educationj,t 1.4309∗∗
(0.6527)
Ln productivityj,t 1.6970∗∗∗
(0.3368)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.0346∗∗∗
(0.1830)
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.859 0.859 0.855 0.856 0.857 0.857 0.766
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks.
Columns (1),(2),(3) are results in the presence of global governance indicators.
(4),(5),(6),(7) are results in presence of socio-economic factors (determinants of FDI).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.5: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Service Liberalization and Environmental Restrictions on FDI Stocks
Specification PPML estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Ln investment f reedomj,t 3.9788∗∗∗ 3.6886∗∗∗ 3.9009∗∗∗ 4.3165∗∗∗ 4.4539∗∗∗ 3.2559∗∗∗ 3.5975∗∗∗
(0.7972) (0.8076) (0.8527) (0.8963) (0.8575) (0.8733) (1.0239)
Ln labour f reedomj,t -0.3852 -0.3686 -0.2547 -0.0768 -0.1569 0.0946 -0.1640
(0.3240) (0.3375) (0.3200) (0.3422) (0.3363) (0.2571) (0.4527)
Ln f inancial f reedomj,t 2.7977∗∗∗ 2.6853∗∗∗ 2.8009∗∗∗ 4.1482∗∗∗ 3.3052∗∗∗ 3.1084∗∗∗ 3.6751∗∗∗
(0.5703) (0.5437) (0.6229) (0.6546) (0.6052) (0.6454) (0.7442)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.5442∗∗∗ 1.5478∗∗∗ 1.5515∗∗∗ 1.4597∗∗∗ 1.5546∗∗∗ 1.4437∗∗∗ 1.1236∗∗∗ 1.5731∗∗∗ 1.5686∗∗∗ 1.5741∗∗∗ 1.4611∗∗∗ 1.5802∗∗∗ 1.4416∗∗∗ 1.1220∗∗∗
(0.0753) (0.0760) (0.0779) (0.0750) (0.0778) (0.0716) (0.0915) (0.0683) (0.0693) (0.0723) (0.0700) (0.0711) (0.0683) (0.0834)
BITij,t -0.2703∗∗∗ -0.3221∗∗∗ -0.3510∗∗∗ -0.3496∗∗∗ -0.3851∗∗∗ -0.1720∗∗ -0.4374∗∗∗ -0.1403 -0.1826∗∗ -0.2116∗∗ -0.2059∗∗ -0.2310∗∗∗ -0.0570 -0.3004∗∗
(0.0887) (0.0928) (0.0902) (0.0903) (0.0922) (0.0848) (0.1271) (0.0893) (0.0913) (0.0873) (0.0951) (0.0875) (0.0749) (0.1247)
LnGDPjt 0.4975∗∗∗ 0.4077∗∗∗ 0.4055∗∗∗ 0.4081∗∗∗ 0.4164∗∗∗ 0.3288∗∗∗ 0.3861∗∗∗ 0.3167∗∗∗ 0.3176∗∗∗ 0.3103∗∗∗ 0.3847∗∗∗ 0.2788∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0629) (0.0624) (0.0787) (0.0493) (0.1091) (0.0780) (0.0829) (0.0808) (0.0921) (0.0503) (0.1336)
langij 0.1026 0.1014 0.0838 0.1170 0.0956 0.0336 0.2046 0.0320 0.0344 0.0220 0.0272 0.0335 -0.0101 0.1082
(0.0915) (0.0947) (0.0972) (0.0981) (0.0980) (0.0907) (0.1338) (0.1121) (0.1130) (0.1147) (0.1209) (0.1178) (0.0936) (0.1464)
borderij -0.1283 -0.1153 -0.1058 -0.1344 -0.1111 0.0082 -0.1703 -0.1417 -0.1258 -0.1215 -0.1281 -0.1295 0.0220 -0.1283
(0.0809) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0916) (0.0840) (0.0782) (0.1238) (0.0966) (0.0981) (0.0978) (0.1117) (0.1025) (0.0756) (0.1342)
Lndistij -0.6077∗∗∗ -0.6272∗∗∗ -0.6397∗∗∗ -0.6511∗∗∗ -0.6562∗∗∗ -0.5235∗∗∗ -0.8923∗∗∗ -0.6352∗∗∗ -0.6438∗∗∗ -0.6547∗∗∗ -0.6786∗∗∗ -0.6661∗∗∗ -0.5105∗∗∗ -0.8647∗∗∗
(0.1050) (0.1078) (0.1048) (0.1065) (0.1099) (0.0897) (0.1408) (0.1075) (0.1085) (0.1063) (0.1117) (0.1084) (0.0840) (0.1383)
LnREERij,t -2.8468∗∗∗ -2.6149∗∗∗ -2.5311∗∗∗ -2.8248∗∗∗ -2.5825∗∗∗ -2.7227∗∗∗ -3.8482∗∗∗ -2.6781∗∗∗ -2.4847∗∗∗ -2.3955∗∗∗ -2.6306∗∗∗ -2.4391∗∗∗ -2.5479∗∗∗ -3.6742∗∗∗
(0.5988) (0.6118) (0.6006) (0.6781) (0.5883) (0.6178) (0.9696) (0.5856) (0.5924) (0.5969) (0.6357) (0.5795) (0.6065) (0.8899)
Politiq stabj,t 0.2845∗∗∗ 0.2470∗∗∗
(0.0665) (0.0638)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.1716∗∗∗ 0.1794∗∗∗
(0.0611) (0.0458)
Regul qualityj,t 0.1261∗∗ 0.1476∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0506)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.7191 0.5934
(0.4730) (0.5149)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.7215∗∗∗ 0.7226∗∗∗
(0.0905) (0.1221)
Ln unit labor costj,t 1.8503 0.7102
(1.1256) (1.7851)
Ln educationj,t 0.0011 0.2872
(0.8904) (0.8000)
Ln productivityj,t 2.2841∗∗∗ 2.4962∗∗∗
(0.3981) (0.4206)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.1804∗∗∗ 1.3280∗∗∗
(0.2080) (0.2170)
R2 0.834 0.833 0.829 0.831 0.831 0.855 0.723 0.814 0.817 0.813 0.808 0.814 0.851 0.713
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.6: Continued
Specification PPML estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Ln business f reedomj,t 0.2330 0.0221 0.9299∗∗∗ 0.2820 0.3673∗ 0.2207 -2.5195∗∗
(0.2347) (0.2677) (0.3374) (0.1978) (0.2095) (0.2179) (1.2184)
Renewable energj,t -0.0329∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0062) (0.0074)
Environ restricj,t 0.2753∗∗∗ 0.2158∗∗ 0.0323 0.3228∗∗∗ 0.3010∗∗∗ 0.2928∗∗∗ 0.2661∗∗∗
(0.1020) (0.0957) (0.1027) (0.1174) (0.1001) (0.0845) (0.1013)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.6251∗∗∗ 1.6081∗∗∗ 1.5956∗∗∗ 1.5449∗∗∗ 1.6385∗∗∗ 1.4998∗∗∗ 1.1640∗∗∗ 1.0668∗∗∗ 1.0344∗∗∗ 0.9750∗∗∗ 0.9952∗∗∗ 1.0750∗∗∗ 0.9671∗∗∗ 0.7502∗∗∗
(0.0655) (0.0672) (0.0707) (0.0708) (0.0710) (0.0661) (0.0837) (0.1055) (0.1072) (0.1054) (0.0983) (0.1125) (0.0918) (0.1070)
BITij,t -0.1460∗ -0.1696∗∗ -0.2035∗∗ -0.2715∗∗∗ -0.2319∗∗∗ -0.0856 -0.3606∗∗∗ -0.2756∗ -0.2783∗ -0.2490∗ -0.3880∗∗∗ -0.3786∗∗ -0.2608∗ -0.3774∗∗
(0.0831) (0.0843) (0.0849) (0.0867) (0.0794) (0.0711) (0.1160) (0.1541) (0.1504) (0.1488) (0.1421) (0.1597) (0.1413) (0.1649)
LnGDPjt 0.3252∗∗∗ 0.2519∗∗∗ 0.2378∗∗∗ 0.1764∗∗ 0.2924∗∗∗ 0.1720 0.6356∗∗∗ 0.5745∗∗∗ 0.6683∗∗∗ 0.5585∗∗∗ 0.3995∗∗∗ 0.4409∗∗∗
(0.0705) (0.0750) (0.0772) (0.0818) (0.0537) (0.1128) (0.1052) (0.1058) (0.1027) (0.1020) (0.0971) (0.1482)
langij 0.1027 0.0929 0.0592 0.1267 0.0990 0.0558 0.2457∗ 0.4223∗∗∗ 0.3740∗∗∗ 0.2898∗∗ 0.5175∗∗∗ 0.3931∗∗∗ 0.3786∗∗∗ 0.5578∗∗∗
(0.1059) (0.1065) (0.1084) (0.1205) (0.1116) (0.0942) (0.1319) (0.1357) (0.1406) (0.1407) (0.1284) (0.1456) (0.1149) (0.1463)
borderij -0.2144∗∗∗ -0.1838∗∗ -0.1565∗ -0.2507∗∗∗ -0.1857∗∗ -0.0508 -0.2259∗ -0.0247 0.0257 0.0844 -0.0544 0.0366 0.1015 -0.0230
(0.0830) (0.0854) (0.0872) (0.0967) (0.0888) (0.0715) (0.1202) (0.1115) (0.1207) (0.1277) (0.1113) (0.1166) (0.1101) (0.1315)
Lndistij -0.6502∗∗∗ -0.6467∗∗∗ -0.6479∗∗∗ -0.7532∗∗∗ -0.6630∗∗∗ -0.5326∗∗∗ -0.8982∗∗∗ -0.7737∗∗∗ -0.7616∗∗∗ -0.7397∗∗∗ -0.7125∗∗∗ -0.7744∗∗∗ -0.6274∗∗∗ -0.9051∗∗∗
(0.1040) (0.1054) (0.1060) (0.1075) (0.1043) (0.0865) (0.1334) (0.1150) (0.1221) (0.1227) (0.1233) (0.1253) (0.1145) (0.1409)
LnREERij,t -2.8735∗∗∗ -2.6174∗∗∗ -2.4414∗∗∗ -2.6826∗∗∗ -2.5063∗∗∗ -2.6740∗∗∗ -3.9793∗∗∗ -7.8570∗∗∗ -7.6839∗∗∗ -7.4235∗∗∗ -7.3138∗∗∗ -7.3806∗∗∗ -8.2327∗∗∗ -10.1500∗∗∗
(0.5668) (0.6008) (0.6127) (0.6784) (0.5641) (0.6264) (0.9073) (1.4134) (1.3581) (1.3008) (1.4931) (1.3758) (1.6445) (1.9867)
Politiq stabj,t 0.3238∗∗∗ 0.3100∗∗∗
(0.0644) (0.1158)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.3181∗∗∗ 0.3720∗∗∗
(0.0507) (0.0756)
Regul qualityj,t 0.3409∗∗∗ 0.7602∗∗∗
(0.0517) (0.1081)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.4377 -0.5337
(0.4619) (0.4882)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.5363∗∗∗ 0.8311∗∗∗
(0.1144) (0.1261)
Ln unit labor costj,t 0.9505 15.2888∗∗∗
(1.3136) (4.5397)
Ln educationj,t 1.9313∗∗∗ 0.6778
(0.7152) (0.9084)
Ln productivityj,t 2.5149∗∗∗ 3.6624∗∗∗
(0.3846) (0.4309)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.7236∗∗∗ 1.2856∗∗∗
(0.2632) (0.2831)
R2 0.820 0.823 0.821 0.808 0.821 0.846 0.721 0.775 0.774 0.772 0.793 0.770 0.801 0.747
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501 3513 3513 3513 3356 3513 3513 2061
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.7: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Sectoral FDI Restrictions on FDI Stocks
Specification PPML estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Ln FDI restr f inanj,t -12.4175∗∗∗ -11.6107∗∗∗ -12.2653∗∗∗ -13.6907∗∗∗ -12.1185∗∗∗ -7.8579∗∗ -12.0557∗∗∗
(3.0128) (2.8889) (2.8935) (4.0142) (2.9749) (3.2859) (3.9657)
Ln FDI restr manuj,t -11.1553∗∗∗ -11.0740∗∗∗ -11.5587∗∗∗ -10.7878∗∗∗ -11.1355∗∗∗ -1.6439 -10.6247∗∗∗
(2.5402) (2.5374) (2.5447) (3.2326) (2.5452) (2.5354) (3.4084)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.6202∗∗∗ 1.6002∗∗∗ 1.6034∗∗∗ 1.5559∗∗∗ 1.6371∗∗∗ 1.5059∗∗∗ 1.1787∗∗∗ 1.6017∗∗∗ 1.5853∗∗∗ 1.5869∗∗∗ 1.5255∗∗∗ 1.6190∗∗∗ 1.4952∗∗∗ 1.1758∗∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0650) (0.0731) (0.0678) (0.0687) (0.0683) (0.0840) (0.0630) (0.0649) (0.0711) (0.0658) (0.0669) (0.0667) (0.0833)
BITij,t -0.2027∗∗ -0.2277∗∗∗ -0.2726∗∗∗ -0.3172∗∗∗ -0.2941∗∗∗ -0.1008 -0.4060∗∗∗ -0.2793∗∗∗ -0.3079∗∗∗ -0.3530∗∗∗ -0.4079∗∗∗ -0.3707∗∗∗ -0.1946∗∗ -0.4820∗∗∗
(0.0831) (0.0841) (0.0818) (0.0861) (0.0798) (0.0779) (0.1191) (0.0948) (0.0980) (0.0974) (0.1058) (0.0964) (0.0932) (0.1392)
LnGDPjt 0.2897∗∗∗ 0.2102∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.1500∗∗ 0.2892∗∗∗ 0.1082 0.3535∗∗∗ 0.2663∗∗∗ 0.2761∗∗∗ 0.2096∗∗∗ 0.3098∗∗∗ 0.1767
(0.0674) (0.0721) (0.0683) (0.0745) (0.0543) (0.1199) (0.0635) (0.0694) (0.0661) (0.0731) (0.0517) (0.1142)
langij 0.1755∗∗ 0.1620∗ 0.1364 0.1803∗ 0.1644∗ 0.0664 0.2735∗∗ 0.1636∗∗ 0.1463∗ 0.1178 0.1730 0.1453 0.0901 0.2606∗∗
(0.0855) (0.0883) (0.0894) (0.1092) (0.0959) (0.0911) (0.1248) (0.0831) (0.0870) (0.0883) (0.1068) (0.0960) (0.0855) (0.1246)
borderij -0.1030 -0.0714 -0.0513 -0.1427 -0.0748 -0.0432 -0.1227 -0.0693 -0.0419 -0.0159 -0.0890 -0.0377 0.0159 -0.0924
(0.0819) (0.0866) (0.0841) (0.0934) (0.0867) (0.0758) (0.1299) (0.0870) (0.0920) (0.0897) (0.1025) (0.0943) (0.0828) (0.1311)
Lndistij -0.5686∗∗∗ -0.5665∗∗∗ -0.5745∗∗∗ -0.6864∗∗∗ -0.5907∗∗∗ -0.5294∗∗∗ -0.8358∗∗∗ -0.5415∗∗∗ -0.5469∗∗∗ -0.5491∗∗∗ -0.6441∗∗∗ -0.5646∗∗∗ -0.4938∗∗∗ -0.8173∗∗∗
(0.0963) (0.0997) (0.0959) (0.1013) (0.0988) (0.0865) (0.1351) (0.1028) (0.1060) (0.1025) (0.1091) (0.1056) (0.0911) (0.1408)
LnREERij,t -2.7646∗∗∗ -2.4935∗∗∗ -2.2805∗∗∗ -2.5045∗∗∗ -2.3916∗∗∗ -2.6471∗∗∗ -3.7793∗∗∗ -2.8354∗∗∗ -2.5431∗∗∗ -2.3185∗∗∗ -2.5838∗∗∗ -2.4337∗∗∗ -2.5912∗∗∗ -3.7220∗∗∗
(0.6255) (0.6659) (0.6326) (0.7427) (0.6281) (0.6452) (0.9251) (0.6937) (0.7233) (0.6851) (0.8062) (0.6852) (0.7073) (1.0064)
Politiq stabj,t 0.3301∗∗∗ 0.3433∗∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0676)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.3109∗∗∗ 0.2974∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0557)
Regul qualityj,t 0.3117∗∗∗ 0.3036∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0601)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.5960 0.7023∗
(0.4134) (0.4089)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.4572∗∗∗ 0.5586∗∗∗
(0.1138) (0.1079)
Ln unit labor costj,t 1.4122 1.9033
(1.1662) (1.2068)
Ln educationj,t 1.7086∗∗∗ 1.7544∗∗∗
(0.6082) (0.6203)
Ln productivityj,t 2.4276∗∗∗ 2.2684∗∗∗
(0.3990) (0.3726)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.4220∗∗∗ 1.3531∗∗∗
(0.2124) (0.1965)
R2 0.849 0.849 0.844 0.830 0.846 0.846 0.742 0.854 0.851 0.845 0.840 0.848 0.858 0.749
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.8: Continued
Specification PPML estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Ln FDI restr bank j,t -6.3643∗∗∗ -5.5677∗∗∗ -5.8073∗∗∗ -6.9472∗∗∗ -5.8576∗∗∗ -2.9602 -3.4429
(2.0485) (1.8649) (1.8052) (2.5233) (1.8818) (2.5124) (2.8298)
Ln Equity restrictionj,t -0.6986∗∗∗ -0.7232∗∗∗ -0.7463∗∗∗ -0.7547∗∗∗ -0.7582∗∗∗ -0.5229∗∗∗ -0.8195∗∗∗
(0.1179) (0.1199) (0.1213) (0.1243) (0.1190) (0.0935) (0.1503)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.6312∗∗∗ 1.6126∗∗∗ 1.6180∗∗∗ 1.5613∗∗∗ 1.6486∗∗∗ 1.5092∗∗∗ 1.1810∗∗∗ 1.5137∗∗∗ 1.4912∗∗∗ 1.4890∗∗∗ 1.4255∗∗∗ 1.5116∗∗∗ 1.4304∗∗∗ 1.0975∗∗∗
(0.0663) (0.0682) (0.0756) (0.0703) (0.0716) (0.0678) (0.0837) (0.0662) (0.0666) (0.0731) (0.0705) (0.0699) (0.0725) (0.0842)
BITij,t -0.2747∗∗∗ -0.2952∗∗∗ -0.3426∗∗∗ -0.4022∗∗∗ -0.3627∗∗∗ -0.1576 -0.4197∗∗∗ -0.2973∗∗∗ -0.3091∗∗∗ -0.3401∗∗∗ -0.4077∗∗∗ -0.3540∗∗∗ -0.2101∗∗∗ -0.4919∗∗∗
(0.0979) (0.1000) (0.0985) (0.1077) (0.0990) (0.1045) (0.1443) (0.0813) (0.0789) (0.0784) (0.0832) (0.0779) (0.0735) (0.1164)
LnGDPjt 0.3675∗∗∗ 0.2787∗∗∗ 0.2845∗∗∗ 0.2223∗∗∗ 0.3135∗∗∗ 0.1691 0.5722∗∗∗ 0.5288∗∗∗ 0.5437∗∗∗ 0.4906∗∗∗ 0.4931∗∗∗ 0.4810∗∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0719) (0.0691) (0.0767) (0.0480) (0.1198) (0.0594) (0.0584) (0.0562) (0.0600) (0.0561) (0.0876)
langij 0.1736∗∗ 0.1527∗ 0.1285 0.1947∗∗ 0.1567∗ 0.0881 0.2456∗ 0.1835∗∗ 0.1749∗∗ 0.1548∗ 0.2324∗∗∗ 0.1798∗ 0.1220 0.2947∗∗
(0.0859) (0.0882) (0.0882) (0.0984) (0.0942) (0.0873) (0.1348) (0.0873) (0.0880) (0.0866) (0.0831) (0.0944) (0.0849) (0.1231)
borderij -0.1349 -0.1096 -0.0920 -0.1641∗ -0.1098 -0.0286 -0.1875 -0.1892∗∗∗ -0.1637∗∗ -0.1507∗∗ -0.2003∗∗∗ -0.1628∗∗ -0.0714 -0.2217∗
(0.0829) (0.0867) (0.0832) (0.0931) (0.0867) (0.0789) (0.1276) (0.0720) (0.0753) (0.0718) (0.0775) (0.0774) (0.0692) (0.1138)
Lndistij -0.5616∗∗∗ -0.5720∗∗∗ -0.5791∗∗∗ -0.6531∗∗∗ -0.5898∗∗∗ -0.5048∗∗∗ -0.8669∗∗∗ -0.7077∗∗∗ -0.7007∗∗∗ -0.7073∗∗∗ -0.7401∗∗∗ -0.7116∗∗∗ -0.6015∗∗∗ -0.9716∗∗∗
(0.1050) (0.1072) (0.1040) (0.1092) (0.1063) (0.0915) (0.1402) (0.0870) (0.0880) (0.0854) (0.0887) (0.0878) (0.0822) (0.1217)
LnREERij,t -2.8271∗∗∗ -2.5588∗∗∗ -2.3559∗∗∗ -2.6231∗∗∗ -2.4378∗∗∗ -2.6296∗∗∗ -3.8471∗∗∗ -3.2745∗∗∗ -3.1229∗∗∗ -2.9830∗∗∗ -3.4052∗∗∗ -3.0538∗∗∗ -2.9946∗∗∗ -4.4644∗∗∗
(0.6394) (0.6691) (0.6396) (0.7505) (0.6336) (0.6738) (0.9738) (0.6829) (0.7142) (0.7072) (0.7566) (0.6793) (0.6836) (1.0403)
Politiq stabj,t 0.3414∗∗∗ 0.2261∗∗∗
(0.0667) (0.0622)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.2968∗∗∗ 0.2466∗∗∗
(0.0527) (0.0527)
Regul qualityj,t 0.2856∗∗∗ 0.2570∗∗∗
(0.0579) (0.0572)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.7230∗ 0.6770
(0.4220) (0.4186)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.5628∗∗∗ 0.9255∗∗∗
(0.1043) (0.0939)
Ln unit labor costj,t 1.8455 -0.5822
(1.1817) (0.9104)
Ln educationj,t 1.6412∗∗ 1.5835∗∗
(0.6515) (0.6867)
Ln productivityj,t 2.4048∗∗∗ 2.0294∗∗∗
(0.3925) (0.3473)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.4356∗∗∗ 1.1502∗∗∗
(0.2038) (0.2000)
R2 0.846 0.843 0.836 0.835 0.840 0.854 0.729 0.843 0.846 0.842 0.845 0.844 0.849 0.743
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501 8902 8902 8902 8256 8902 8902 4501
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.9: Impact of Restrictions on Cross-Border Financial Transactions on FDI
Specification PPML estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global gov Socio-economic
indicators factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chinn− Ito indexj,t 0.0946∗ 0.0799∗ 0.1210∗∗∗ 0.1211∗∗ 0.1651∗∗∗ -0.0208 0.1127∗
(0.0512) (0.0484) (0.0449) (0.0540) (0.0479) (0.0557) (0.0675)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.5783∗∗∗ 1.5445∗∗∗ 1.5566∗∗∗ 1.4611∗∗∗ 1.5861∗∗∗ 1.5362∗∗∗ 1.1423∗∗∗
(0.1007) (0.0956) (0.1115) (0.0917) (0.1082) (0.0887) (0.1057)
BITij,t -0.0369 -0.0255 -0.0736 -0.1823∗∗ -0.1204 -0.0374 -0.1689
(0.0857) (0.0840) (0.0853) (0.0888) (0.0839) (0.0776) (0.1209)
LnGDPjt 0.5296∗∗∗ 0.5016∗∗∗ 0.4878∗∗∗ 0.4454∗∗∗ 0.4236∗∗∗ 0.4928∗∗∗
(0.0977) (0.0939) (0.0964) (0.0971) (0.0936) (0.1435)
langij 0.1355 0.1254 0.1048 0.1882 0.1382 0.1063 0.2333
(0.1532) (0.1540) (0.1574) (0.1485) (0.1607) (0.1397) (0.1895)
borderij -0.1553∗ -0.1201 -0.1094 -0.1351 -0.1415 -0.0572 -0.1413
(0.0827) (0.0884) (0.0868) (0.0827) (0.0907) (0.0752) (0.1198)
Lndistij -0.6016∗∗∗ -0.5890∗∗∗ -0.5939∗∗∗ -0.6378∗∗∗ -0.6204∗∗∗ -0.5304∗∗∗ -0.8234∗∗∗
(0.1028) (0.1047) (0.1029) (0.0978) (0.1034) (0.0981) (0.1386)
LnREERij,t -2.7328∗∗∗ -2.5821∗∗∗ -2.4014∗∗∗ -2.9198∗∗∗ -2.4785∗∗∗ -2.4947∗∗∗ -3.9003∗∗∗
(0.6810) (0.7181) (0.7016) (0.7942) (0.6966) (0.6600) (0.9331)
Politiq stabj,t 0.2292∗∗∗
(0.0765)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.2885∗∗∗
(0.0633)
Regul qualityj,t 0.2448∗∗∗
(0.0549)
Ln tax burdenj,t -0.4192
(0.4144)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.9153∗∗∗
(0.1042)
Ln unit labor costj,t -2.2794∗∗∗
(0.6677)
Ln educationj,t 0.3726
(0.6651)
Ln productivityj,t 1.8342∗∗∗
(0.3998)
Logistic per f indexj,t 1.1610∗∗∗
(0.2796)
R2 0.808 0.812 0.808 0.820 0.808 0.829 0.707
Observations 8652 8652 8652 8006 8652 8652 4374
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.10: Gravity Estimation Results of Impact of Regulatory Difference, Doing
Business Variables, Factors Endowments on Inward FDI Stocks
Baseline Regulatory Exclusion Doing business factor endowments
difference Countries variables
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln FDI restrj,t -0.5181∗∗∗ -0.0444 -0.6275∗∗∗ -0.8222∗∗∗ -0.8223∗∗∗ -0.5044∗∗∗ -0.3616∗∗∗
(0.1116) (0.1706) (0.1262) (0.1388) (0.1333) (0.0919) (0.0684)
Di f f FDI restrij,t -1.5209∗ 0.1573 -2.5726∗∗
(0.8675) (0.0963) (1.0256)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.3810∗∗∗ 1.4569∗∗∗ 1.4457∗∗∗ 1.4452∗∗∗ 1.3656∗∗∗ 1.4435∗∗∗ 1.1751∗∗∗ 1.2074∗∗∗ 1.5891∗∗∗ 1.6699∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0651) (0.0681) (0.0671) (0.0708) (0.0746) (0.0899) (0.0817) (0.0706) (0.0753)
BITij,t -0.3040∗∗∗ -0.1901∗∗ -0.1687∗∗ -0.2459∗∗∗ -0.0974 -0.2636∗∗∗ -0.4723∗∗∗ -0.4284∗∗∗ -0.3399∗∗∗ -0.3358∗∗∗
(0.0845) (0.0825) (0.0796) (0.0914) (0.1208) (0.0854) (0.1045) (0.1154) (0.0800) (0.0801)
langij 0.2177∗∗∗ 0.1271 0.1189 0.1454∗ 0.4323∗∗∗ 0.2393∗∗∗ 0.5305∗∗∗ 0.4919∗∗∗ 0.2103∗∗∗ 0.1857∗∗
(0.0672) (0.0803) (0.0890) (0.0769) (0.0791) (0.0743) (0.1013) (0.1524) (0.0809) (0.0829)
borderij -0.0432 -0.0697 -0.0687 -0.0271 -0.0283 -0.0640 -0.2116∗∗ -0.1427 0.0245 -0.0210
(0.0766) (0.0714) (0.0733) (0.0840) (0.0822) (0.0676) (0.0975) (0.1442) (0.0825) (0.0837)
Lndistij -0.5120∗∗∗ -0.5414∗∗∗ -0.5250∗∗∗ -0.5016∗∗∗ -0.4273∗∗∗ -0.4774∗∗∗ -0.7785∗∗∗ -0.8897∗∗∗ -0.3859∗∗∗ -0.4076∗∗∗
(0.0886) (0.0888) (0.0897) (0.0923) (0.0971) (0.0831) (0.1094) (0.1348) (0.0807) (0.0924)
LnREERij,t -2.9856∗∗∗ -3.0191∗∗∗ -2.8534∗∗∗ -2.7454∗∗∗ -3.1594∗∗∗ -2.4032∗∗∗ -5.9451∗∗∗ -6.7122∗∗∗ -3.0375∗∗∗ -2.8891∗∗∗
(0.7773) (0.6791) (0.6809) (0.7150) (0.7521) (0.7734) (1.4536) (1.4737) (0.7057) (0.6614)
Regul qualityj,t 0.1589∗∗∗ 0.1383∗∗∗ 0.1304∗∗∗ 0.1511∗∗∗ 0.3276∗∗∗ 0.0941∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0505) (0.0480) (0.0557) (0.1182) (0.0391)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.7756∗∗∗ 0.5905∗∗∗ 0.6077∗∗∗ 0.5839∗∗∗ 0.9751∗∗∗ 0.8297∗∗∗ 0.9965∗∗∗
(0.0863) (0.0826) (0.0874) (0.0837) (0.1095) (0.0993) (0.1110)
Ln educationj,t -0.5573 -0.5958 -0.6241 -0.4734 -0.7233 0.4060
(0.5942) (0.6846) (0.6853) (0.6597) (0.7316) (0.6582)
Ln productivityj,t 1.1324∗∗∗ 1.7733∗∗∗ 1.9205∗∗∗ 1.5660∗∗∗ -0.0025 1.0114∗∗∗
(0.3463) (0.4223) (0.4322) (0.4173) (0.3759) (0.2848)
Ln starting business 4.7928∗∗∗
(1.4151)
Ln en f orcing contracts 1.4601∗∗
(0.7348)
Ln resolving insolvency 1.7258∗∗∗
(0.3281)
FDij,t -1.3459∗∗∗
(0.2400)
HCDij,t -0.2819∗∗∗
(0.1000)
R2 0.862 0.860 0.855 0.859 0.870 0.899 0.827 0.770 0.873 0.859
Observations 8902 8902 8902 8902 7664 8274 6327 5240 8902 8902
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.11: Alternative Construction of Dependent Variable.
Baseline Including CPPML Busse and Normalized by Normalized
PPML zeros FDI estimate Hefeker (2007) lagged GDP, by GDP
estimate OLS estimate trans- PPML estimate deflator
formation, PPML estimate
OLS estimate
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln FDI restrj,t -0.5181∗∗∗ -0.0810∗∗∗ -0.7241∗∗ -0.1137∗∗∗ -0.5574∗∗∗ -0.5232∗∗∗
(0.1116) (0.0181) (0.3228) (0.0254) (0.1163) (0.1132)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.3810∗∗∗ 0.7211∗∗∗ 1.5334∗∗∗ 3.2557∗∗∗ 1.2512∗∗∗ 1.3721∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0132) (0.0729) (0.0614) (0.0794) (0.0757)
BITij,t -0.3040∗∗∗ -0.0133 -0.1555∗∗ -0.0474∗ -0.3408∗∗∗ -0.3085∗∗∗
(0.0845) (0.0178) (0.0780) (0.0246) (0.0875) (0.0862)
langij 0.2177∗∗∗ 0.2090∗∗∗ 0.1416∗∗ 0.3133∗∗∗ 0.2390∗∗∗ 0.2173∗∗∗
(0.0672) (0.0371) (0.0622) (0.0567) (0.0707) (0.0687)
borderij -0.0432 0.1140∗∗∗ 0.0011 0.2033∗∗∗ -0.0440 -0.0406
(0.0766) (0.0307) (0.0705) (0.0464) (0.0799) (0.0771)
Ln distij -0.5120∗∗∗ -0.1505∗∗∗ -0.5110∗∗∗ -0.1669∗∗∗ -0.5355∗∗∗ -0.5149∗∗∗
(0.0886) (0.0226) (0.0688) (0.0320) (0.0944) (0.0902)
Ln REERij,t -2.9856∗∗∗ -0.1836 0.2427 -0.3882 -3.1540∗∗∗ -2.9828∗∗∗
(0.7773) (0.1705) (0.4828) (0.2397) (0.8528) (0.7808)
Regul qualityj,t 0.1589∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ -0.6951∗∗∗ 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.1551∗∗∗ 0.1662∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0137) (0.1741) (0.0185) (0.0559) (0.0588)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.7756∗∗∗ 0.2269∗∗∗ 0.2684∗∗∗ 0.8070∗∗∗ 0.7834∗∗∗
(0.0863) (0.0151) (0.0202) (0.0887) (0.0865)
Ln educationj,t -0.5573 -0.2042 -5.3608∗ -0.2196 -0.3788 -0.5448
(0.5942) (0.1353) (3.1964) (0.1787) (0.6385) (0.6005)
Ln productivityj,t 1.1324∗∗∗ 0.1199∗∗ 6.7723∗∗∗ 0.1549∗∗ 1.1558∗∗∗ 1.1167∗∗∗
(0.3463) (0.0559) (1.2057) (0.0732) (0.3592) (0.3453)
Ln GDPjt 2.8037∗∗∗
(0.6473)
Ln GDPit 1.0118∗∗∗
(0.1298)
Source− time f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Source− Host− f ixed e f f ect No No Yes No No No
Time− f ixed e f f ect No No Yes No No No
Log− likelihood -233711.26 -125826.17 -1977551.5 -234628.5
R2 0.862 0.836 0.946 0.798 0.863 0.860
Observations 8902 9098 8650 9098 8901 8902
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks.
The column 4 considers zero and negative FDI.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.12: Host vs. source Country FDI Restrictions.
No controls Host Both Difference Difference Interaction
country country restriction restriction with term with
controls controls host restriction host-source
restrictions
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln FDI restri,t(source) -0.1782 -0.2113 -0.4663∗∗∗
(0.1396) (0.1415) (0.0997)
Ln FDI restrj,t(host) -4.3671∗∗∗ 0.0954 -0.9742∗∗∗ -0.5158∗∗∗
(0.5124) (0.3769) (0.3228) (0.1100)
Di f f FDI restrij,t -1.7013∗∗ 0.2471
(0.7536) (0.8020)
Di f f FDI restrij,t∗
FDI restrj,t(host) -7.5332
(8.4184)
Di f f FDI restrij,t∗
FDI restrj,t(host) -17.0999∗∗∗
(3.2390)
Source− Host− f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes No No No
Source− Host− time f ixed e f f ect No No No Yes No Yes
Source− time f ixed e f f ect No No No No Yes No
Time− f ixed e f f ect Yes Yes Yes No No No
Host controls No Yes Yes No Yes No
Source controls No No Yes No No No
Bilateral controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.928 0.926 0.946 0.930 0.863 0.930
Observations 9799 8650 8650 9799 8902 9799
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks.
Di f f FDI restrij,t = |FDI restrj,t − FDI restri,t|.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.13: Gravity Estimation Results with Instrumental Variable.
Specification 2SLS estimate
Dependant variable Inward FDI stock
Year 2010-2017
Global Gov Socio-Economic
Factors Factors
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln FDI restr+j,t -0.1490
∗∗∗ -0.1595∗∗∗ -0.1491∗∗∗ -0.2195∗∗∗ -0.1638∗∗∗ -0.1292∗∗∗ -0.2540∗∗∗
(0.0447) (0.0418) (0.0412) (0.0467) (0.0412) (0.0419) (0.0626)
LnFDIij,t−1 0.7245∗∗∗ 0.7221∗∗∗ 0.7210∗∗∗ 0.7153∗∗∗ 0.7248∗∗∗ 0.7240∗∗∗ 0.5990∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0163)
BITij,t -0.0397∗∗ -0.0299 -0.0314∗ -0.0651∗∗∗ -0.0429∗∗ -0.0238 -0.0820∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0214) (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0289)
Ln Trade opennessj,t 0.2509∗∗∗ 0.2454∗∗∗ 0.2427∗∗∗ 0.2894∗∗∗ 0.2467∗∗∗ 0.2278∗∗∗ 0.3107∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0238)
langij 0.2272∗∗∗ 0.2232∗∗∗ 0.2182∗∗∗ 0.2340∗∗∗ 0.2319∗∗∗ 0.2206∗∗∗ 0.3396∗∗∗
(0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0357) (0.0374) (0.0355) (0.0366) (0.0550)
borderij 0.1076∗∗∗ 0.1141∗∗∗ 0.1157∗∗∗ 0.1084∗∗∗ 0.1096∗∗∗ 0.1173∗∗∗ 0.1623∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0338) (0.0310) (0.0305) (0.0470)
Ln distij -0.1441∗∗∗ -0.1399∗∗∗ -0.1409∗∗∗ -0.1528∗∗∗ -0.1406∗∗∗ -0.1276∗∗∗ -0.2285∗∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0262) (0.0234) (0.0239) (0.0353)
LnREERij,t -0.1937 -0.1987 -0.1992 -0.2265 -0.1951 -0.2048 -0.2689
(0.1687) (0.1697) (0.1691) (0.1857) (0.1693) (0.1686) (0.2787)
Politiq stabj,t 0.0205∗∗
(0.0087)
Gov e f f ectivj,t 0.0483∗∗∗
(0.0109)
Regul qualityj,t 0.0686∗∗∗
(0.0109)
Ln tax burdenj,t 0.2178∗∗∗
(0.0686)
Ln unit labor costj,t 1.0696∗∗∗
(0.1977)
Ln educationj,t 0.2260∗
(0.1204)
Ln productivityj,t 0.1979∗∗∗
(0.0473)
Logistic per f indexj,t 0.1086∗∗∗
(0.0284)
Durbin 8.09714∗∗∗ 10.9111∗∗∗ 7.9452∗∗∗ 24.5611∗∗∗ 12.1945∗∗∗ 4.85083∗∗ 11.3571∗∗∗
Wu− Hausman 7.84603∗∗∗ 10.576∗∗∗ 7.69867∗∗∗ 23.7834∗∗∗ 11.8217∗∗∗ 4.69871∗∗ 11.013∗∗∗
F− statistics 277.303∗∗∗ 330.841∗∗∗ 339.457∗∗∗ 263.816∗∗∗ 358.135∗∗∗ 321.502∗∗∗ 307.032∗∗∗
Source− time f ixed f f ect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.832 0.834 0.835 0.773
Observations 9098 9098 9098 8439 9098 9098 4587
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks.
Columns (1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(6),(7) are performed using 2SLS estimation.
Columns (1),(2),(3) are results in the presence of Global Governance Indicators.
(4),(5),(6),(7) are results in presence of Socio-Economic Factors.
(+) controlled for endogeneity
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level.
*, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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